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A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
NEWSPAPERS: IS THERE LIFE AFTER
TORNILLO?
Michael Gary Chatzky* and William Eric Robinson**
INTRODUCTION
A right of access to "public forums" for the holders of
diverse viewpoints has been judicially granted with reference
to privately-owned streets and sidewalks' and shopping cen-
ters.2 In addition, the courts have acknowledged the import-
ance of both the print and broadcast media as forums for
speech.3 Those who favor a first amendment-based right of
access frequently emphasize the necessity of having these for-
ums available to the representatives of partisan ideas.
For years, the Miami Herald has been the largest newspa-
per published in Florida.4 In the fall of 1972, the Herald pub-
lished two editorials critical of Pat L. Tornillo, Jr., a candidate
for the Florida House of Representatives. When Tornillo de-
manded that the newspaper print his replies, it refused. Tor-
nillo brought suit in Dade County Circuit Court, seeking decla-
ratory and injunctive relief and over $5000 in actual and puni-
* B.S., 1966, University of Maryland; J.D., 1969, University of Maryland; Mem-
ber, California Bar; Member of the Board of Directors and former Chairperson, Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, Santa Clara Valley Chapter; Legal
Counsel, Committee for Open Media.
** B.A., 1971, Amherst College; J.D., 1976, University of Santa Clara.
1. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946).
2. In Amalgamated Food Employers Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968), the Supreme Court held that union pickets could not be prohibited from
peaceful picketing within a privately owned shopping center which serves as the "func-
tional equivalent of a [municipal] 'business block.' " Id. at 324. In its most recent
shopping center case, however, the Court has retreated from that position. Overruling
Logan Valley, the Court held in Hudgens v. NLRB, 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976), that a
privately owned shopping center is not a public forum merely by virtue of being a
shopping center, and a merchant's decision to exclude persons attempting to exercise
free speech rights does not constitute state action.
3. See, e.g., Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth Century Soapbox: The Right to
Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 VA. L. REV. 574, 582 & n.4 (1971) thereinafter
cited as Johnson], citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Lee v. Board of Regents of
State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F.
Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
4. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 83 (Fla. 1973), rev'd,
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
tive damages.' The action was based on Florida's "right of
reply" statute.' The trial court denied Tornillo's request for
injunctive relief and held that the statute was an unconstitu-
tional violation of freedom of the press.7
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed,' holding
that the statute actually enhanced freedom of speech and
press.' The fundamental purpose of the first amendment, the
court said, was "to inform the people."'" At no time was the
public's "need to know" more critical than during an election
campaign." ' The Florida court emphasized that the publisher's
freedom from prior restraint carried with it a responsibility to
keep the public fully informed. The court also noted that
competition among newspapers was quickly becoming a thing
of the past and that "news corporations" today enjoy "mono-
5. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244 (1974).
6. Id. at 244 n.2. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, ch. 104, § 104.38 (West 1973) (repealed
1975), provided in relevant part:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any
candidate for nomination or for election with malfeasance or misfeasance
in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another free
space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request of such candi-
date immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in
as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that
calls for such reply, provided such reply does not take up more space than
the matter replied to. Any person or firm failing to comply with the
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first
degree ....
7. 418 U.S. at 245; see note 9 infra.
8. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 80-84, 86-87 (Fla.
1973), construing U.S. CONST. amend. I, rev'd, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); see notes 9 & 154-
72 and accompanying text infra.
9. 287 So. 2d at 82, 87. The first amendment states in relevant part: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State . . . shall
. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The first amendment has been extended through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to prohibit the abridgement of the rights specified therein by
the various states. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
10. 287 So. 2d at 85.
11. Id. at 80.
12. Id., citing New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Lamont
v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141(1943); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1930). In Tornillo, the Florida Supreme Court
held that the challenged reply statute, see note 6 supra, did not constitute a "prior
restraint" by government since it did not exclude any specified newspaper content. 287
So. 2d at 82.
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polistic influence" over vast regions of the country; 3 the trend
toward monopolization has worked to deprive the public of its
right to know both sides of controversial subjects. 4 In blunt
language, the court declared:
Freedom of expression was retained by the people
through the First Amendment for all the people and not
merely for a select few. The First Amendment did not
create a privileged class which through a monopoly of in-
struments of the newspaper industry would be able to deny
to the people the freedom of expression which the First
Amendment guarantees.
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Tornillo v.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. carried favorable implications
for the concept of a constitutional right of access to newspa-
pers. The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected
those implications outright."
This article will examine the constitutional underpinnings
of a "right of access" doctrine in relation to newspapers. The
writers will sketch the pattern of dwindling competition in the
newepaper industry, giving particular attention to the Newspa-
per Preservation Act as the culmination of that pattern. The
article will consider the emergence of the first amendment-
based rights to communicate in an effective manner and to
receive information from diversified sources. In this context,
competing first amendment interests of broadcasters and the
public will be analyzed. The discussion will then focus upon
Tornillo and other recent federal cases dealing with the issues
of access to the printed media, the power of government to
affect newspaper content, and government involvement in edi-
torial decision-making. Finally, the authors will suggest alter-
13. 287 So. 2d at 82-83. The court observed:
The right of the public to know all sides of a controversy and from
such information to be able to make an enlightened choice is being jeop-
ardized by the growing concentration of the ownership of the mass media
into fewer and fewer hands, resulting ultimately in a form of private
censorship. Through consolidation, syndication, acquisition of radio and
television stations and the demise of vast numbers of newspapers, compe-
tition is rapidly vanishing . ...
Id.
14. Id. at 83.
15. Id., citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
16. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), rev'g 287 So.
2d 78 (Fla. 1973). See notes 154-72 and accompanying text infra.
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native possibilities for implementing a right of access to news-
papers.
I. THE PATTERN OF DWINDLING COMPETITION
In December of 1791, the idea that newspapers and other
publications should be free from governmental censorship
found its way into the federal constitution. 7 To the original
sponsors of the first amendment," the "press" which warranted
such constitutional protection was far different from the con-
temporary "mass media." It is extremely unlikely that the
founders of our nation could have foreseen the technological
changes that would produce radio and television; nor could
they have foreseen the gradual concentration of power and in-
fluence in the hands of a steadily decreasing number of news-
paper publishers."
The late eighteenth century was an era of extensive politi-
cal pamphleteering. Analyzing the role of the press in the early
1800's, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, "Americans have nowhere
established any central direction of opinion, any more than of
the conduct of affairs . . . . In America there is scarcely a
hamlet that has not its newspaper."' " De Tocqueville further
observed:
The facility with which newspapers can be established pro-
duces a multitude of them ....
[The] influence [of the press] in America is im-
mense. It causes political life to circulate through all the
parts of that vast territory . . . .It rallies the interest of
17. The adoption of the first amendment occurred only after considerable debate
as to whether an explicit limitation on congressional power was really needed in this
area. Hamilton wrote:
[Bills of rights are [not only] . . .unnecessary in the proposed consti-
tution but would even be dangerous. They would contain various excep-
tions to powers which are not granted .... I will not contend that such
a provision would confer a regulatory power: but it is evident that it
would furnish to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming
that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Consti-
tution ought not to be charged with absurdity of providing against the
abuse of an authority, which is not given, and that the provision against
restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a
power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it, was intended to be
vested in the national government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)(A. Hamilton).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see note 9 supra.
19. See notes 23-46 and accompanying text infra.
20. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 185-88 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
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the community round certain principles and draws up the
creed of every party; for it affords a means of intercourse
between those who hear and address each other without
ever coming into immediate contact."
Daily newspapers continued to multiply throughout the
latter half of the nineteenth century. Competition for readers
forced newspapers to strive for their own unique brands of ap-
peal. Publishers, like the economic entrepreneurs of this era,
adopted individualistic approaches to journalism, and innova-
tion often brought success and achievement.22
Between 1880 and 1945, the proportion of American com-
munities having only one daily newspaper increased sharply.
2
Where a city was able to boast two or more newspapers, they
were often neither separately owned nor truly competitive. As
early as 1930, it was not uncommon to find that all the newspa-
pers of a particular locale were controlled by the same entity.
24
This was underscored by the fact that in 1880 only one of the
21. Id. (emphasis added). The alleged infrequency with which controversial is-
sues and unorthodox viewpoints are aired in today's news media, see notes 112-14 and
accompanying text infra, is not necessarily a twentieth-century phenomenon. De
Tocqueville's comparison of French and American newspapers is enlightening:
A glance at a French and American newspaper is sufficient to show the
difference that exists in this respect between the two nations. In France
the space allotted to commercial advertisements is very limited and the
news intelligence not considerable, but the essential part of the journal
is the discussion of the politics of the day. In America three quarters of
the enormous sheet are filled with advertisements, and the remainder is
frequently occupied by political intelligence or trivial anecdotes; it is only
from time to time that one finds a corner devoted to the passionate
discussions like those which the journalists of France every day give to
their readers.
Id. at 185.
22. E. EMERY & H. SMITH, THE PRESS AND AMERICA 513 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as EMERY].
23. Id. at 516. In 1880, there were 850 English-language newspapers of general
circulation in the United States. In that same year, 389 cities had one or more daily
newspapers; 38 percent of those cities had only one daily paper. The "one-daily"
communities, however, were mostly small towns; only four had populations in excess
of 25,000. Id.
In 1910, there were 2200 dailies in circulation in over 1200 cities. About 42 percent
of these 1200 cities had only a single daily newspaper. Id. At the same time, 25 of the
506 "one-daily" towns had populations in excess of 25,000. Id. at 513.
By the end of World War II, the number of daily newspapers in the United States
had declined to 1744. Nearly 80 percent of the 1400 cities with newspapers were "one-
daily" communities. And 173 of those communities had plus-25,000 populations; 21
had populations in excess of 100,000. Id. See also J. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 177-
78 (rev. ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as WIGGINS].
24. WIGGINS, supra note 23, at 177-78.
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many cities with two or more newspapers had its daily presses
controlled by a single party; fifty years later, 112 such cities
each had newspapers run by a single combination.25 This trend
prompted Oswald Garrison Villard to write in 1944:
"[Cloupled with the alarming mortality among our dailies,
[the] tendencies toward chain ownership, consolidation, and
monopolies are more obvious than ever."20
The pattern of dwindling competition, combined with in-
creased concentration of ownership and control, has continued
to the present. In 1968, more than 85 percent of the 1500 cities
served by daily newspapers were one-newspaper cities.27 An
additional 150 cities were served by two dailies under single
ownership.2" In 1968, over 95 percent of America's cities and
towns had daily newspapers controlled by a single owner.29 In
addition, it is common today for newspapers and newspaper
chains to own and control television stations. In the nation's
top 25 media "market areas," there are 97 television stations,
33 of which are owned by newspapers." Of the 69 newspapers
in those same market areas, 28 own television stations.3'
The reasons for the rapid movement toward monopoliza-
tion of newspaper market areas have been summarized as fol-
lows: technological improvements which brought increasing
financial responsibility and risks for newspaper publishers;
"standardization of the product," the result of attempts by
newspapers to appeal to a mass market, which discouraged
individuality and eliminated the need for readers to read more
than one newspaper; shifts in advertising and circulation pat-
terns (advertisers tended to buy space in one metropolitan
25. Id.
26. 0. VILLARD, THE DISAPPEARING DAILY V(1944) [hereinafter cited as VILLARD].
Villard was editor of the New York Evening Post and the Nation. The grandson of
William Lloyd Garrison, Villard was also instrumental in founding the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People. See also Broun, Those Charming
People, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE NATION 197 (H. Christman ed. 1965).
27. H.R. REP. No. 91-1193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reported in 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3547, 3548 (1970) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 91-1193].
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also notes 198-201 and accompanying text infra.
30. Washington Post, Mar. 14, 1963, § A, at 2, col. 3.
31. Id. See, e.g., Bennet, Media Concentration and the F.C.C.: Focusing with a
Section Seven Lens, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 159, 181-86 (1971); Flynn, Antitrust and the
Newspapers, 22 VAND. L. REV. 103, 120 (1968); Johnson & Hoack, Media Concentra-
tion: Some Observations on the United States' Experience, 56 IA. L. REV. 267, 269, 271
(1970); Comment, "Cross-Media" Ownership and the Antitrust Laws-A Critical
Analysis and a Suggested Solution, 47 N.C.L. REv. 794, 802-05 (1969).
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newspaper with substantial circulation-mass reader ap-
peal-rather than in several papers with overlapping or spe-
cialized circulation); lack of economic or social need for some
newspapers-particularly the decline in foreign language news-
papers and political party organs; managerial faults; the effects
of wartime inflation and general business depressions; and in-
tentional consolidation of newspapers." Villard, for one, ex-
pressed alarm at "the danger that our dailies will be more and
more controlled by individuals of enormous wealth, committed
to the preservation of the status quo because of their material
prosperity."3 He was chagrined that daily newspapers had be-
come important industrial enterprises. Newspaper publishers,
he wrote,
are entitled to rank among the foremost mercantile leaders
of the community. Their tendency is naturally to think
and act as do the members of the economic group to which
they belong, and to drift steadily from the plain people and
especially from the workers. Just as the profession of jour-
nalism has changed into a business, so there is every temp-
tation for the proprietors to consider all political and eco-
nomic questions from the point of view of those who have
very large economic stakes and to look with alarm upon all
proposed social and political reforms. 4
The trend toward centralization in the daily press became
clear at approximately the same time that Congress passed the
Clayton Anti-Trust Act,3" giving United States district courts
the power to enjoin violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.3"
Section 2 of the Sherman Act made it illegal for any person to
"monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states."37 The antitrust laws man-
ifested the view of Congress that the federal government had
an affirmative duty to insure competition in the economic mar-
ketplace. The laws were an admission on the part of govern-
ment that a laissez-faire policy was legally and economically
unsuitable in the modern world of big business.
32. EMERY, supra note 22, at 516-23; VILLARD, supra note 26, at 3-18.
33. VILLARD, supra note 26, at vi.
34. Id. at 5.
35. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970); see note 23 supra.
36. 26 Stat. 209 (1890); as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
37. Id.
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However, Congress exempted certain specified joint
newspaper-operating arrangements from the federal antitrust
laws when it enacted the Newspaper Preservation Act in 1970.38
The Act allowed two or more newspaper publications to com-
bine their production, distribution, and sales facilities-pro-
vided that only one of them remained or became a "financially
sound publication."39 As long as this type of arrangement
fostered "no merger, combination, or amalgamation of
editorial or reportorial staffs,"4 and editorial policies were
independently determined," newspapers could consolidate
without incurring violations of the Federal Trade Commission
Act,4 the Sherman Act,43 the Wilson Tariff Act,44 or the Clay-
ton Act.4" The Newspaper Preservation Act embodied the con-
gressional conclusion that some monopolization is essential to
maintain editorial and reportorial diversity in the press."
II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS: CONTEMPORARY
INTERPRETATIONS
The reduction in the number of independent participants
in the newspaper industry has necessarily reduced the quantity
of space available for the reporting of daily news stories, cur-
rent events and feature articles, as well as the amount of space
available for the publication of editorial opinion and divergent
social, political, and philosophical viewpoints. The Newspaper
Preservation Act was designed to halt the shrinkage of print
space available to community readership. It is curious that this
legislatively recognized shortage of print resources has failed to
prompt the same kind of judicial concern as has the scarcity
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1970).
39. Id. § 1803(a). See note 255 infra.
40. Id. § 1802(2).
41. Id.
42. Id. §§ 41-58 formerly 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
43. Id. §§ 1-7, formerly 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
44. Id. §§ 8-11, formerly 28 Stat. 570 (1894).
45. Id. §§ 12-27, formerly 38 Stat. 730 (1914). See H.R. REP. No. 91-1193, supra
note 27, at 3556.
46. H.R. REP. No. 91-1193, supra note 27, at 3547. Economic data in 1970,
however, showed that the newspaper industry was not exactly in dire straits; see id.
at 3557. House Judiciary Committee members Clark McGregor and Abner J. Mikva
expressed strong opposition to the Newspaper Preservation Act. Id. at 3556-58. They
argued that available data did not warrant the "sweeping repudiation of competition
in the newspaper industry" which the Act represented. Id. at 3557.
460 [Vol. 16
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of "airwaves" in the broadcast industry. 7 While a full inquiry
into the differing standards of governmental regulation and
constitutional protection in the two industries is beyond the
scope of this article, certain comparisons are useful in analyz-
ing recent United States Supreme Court decisions bearing on
the concept of an enforceable right of access to the print media.
Before these comparisons can be undertaken, however, it is
necessary to examine contemporary interpretations of the first
amendment freedoms of speech and the press.4"
The Vanishing Marketplace
For generations, political analysts have tended to perceive
the publisher's right to print in an environment totally free
from governmental interference as the main bulwark of free-
dom of the press. James Madison viewed the first amendment
as exempting the press "not only from previous restraint of the
executive, . . . but from legislative restraint also."49 The press
was seen as an ally of political dialogue, inseparable from "the
right of electing the members of the government."5 ° The Sedi-
tion Act,5 which made it a criminal offense to publish con-
temptuous statements about government officials, drew this
angry response from the Virginia Resolutions (1799-1800):
[Tihe unconstitutional power exercised over the press by
the Sedition Act ought, more than any other, to produce
universal alarm; because it is levelled against that right of
freely examining public characters and measures, and of
free communication among the people thereon which has
47. See, e.g., CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 785 (1948); Lange, The
Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review
and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 67 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Lange]; Robinson,
The FCC and the First Amendment, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67 (1967); Note, Concepts of
the Broadcast Media Under the First Amendment: A Reevaluation and a Proposal, 47
N.Y.U.L. REV. 83 (1972). See also notes 122-27 and accompanying text infra.
48. See note 9 supra. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 states: "Every person may freely
speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."
The California Supreme Court has construed this constitutional provision as "more
definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment." Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.
3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975).
49. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 570 (1936).
50. Id.
51. The Sedition Act is comprised of three different statutes: Act of June 25,
1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1801); Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (expired
1801); Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
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ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of 227
every other right.',
Political speech, then, lies at the heart of the first amend-
ment;u" and a press absolutely exempt from government inter-
vention has been viewed traditionally as the ally of free politi-
cal speech.
The assumption that driving a constitutional wedge be-
tween government and the publishing process will result in the
optimum flow of competing viewpoints has strong constitu-
tional roots. In his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States,54
Justice Holmes declared, "[T]he best test of truth is the
power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitu-
tion."5  It has been suggested that this "marketplace of ideas"
doctrine is a "romantic" view of the first amendment which
tolerates the repression of competing ideas, including divergent
political views, by the mass communications industry." The
marketplace theory, it is argued, fails to take into account the
realities which prevail in the newspaper industry. 7 As in-
dustrial giants have come to dominate the publishing land-
scape, freedom of the press-a right granted to all of the peo-
ple-allegedly has become "the privilege of media managers
and owners." '55 Nicholas Johnson, a former Federal Communi-
cations Commissioner, has warned that the chief threat of cen-
sorship comes not from the government but from those private
economic interests which restrict access to the media. 59
Those who advocate new, constitutionally based guaran-
tees for keeping print and broadcast forums responsive to a
variety of perspectives maintain that the marketplace of ideas
52. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 573 (1936).
53. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641, 1668 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Barron], discussed in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 & n.8, 252-53 & n.18 (1974).
54. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 630.
56. Barron, supra note 53, at 1641-43, 1645-48.
57. Id. at 1644-47. See, e.g., notes 23-46 and accompanying text supra, and notes
112-14 and accompanying text infra.
58. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER REPORT No. 005, REGULATORY PLURALISM IN
THE PRESS? 1 (1967). This report states in part: "The freedoms of the First Amendment
must be protected not only against tyrannies of the government and the governing
majorities, they must also be protected against the non-governing minorities who
control the machinery of communications." Id.
59. Johnson, supra note 3, at 604.
(Vol. 16
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is no longer self-operating and perhaps never was.'" It is a mar-
ketplace which, by the very nature of its economic structure,
cannot be freely accessible to everyone. For all intents and
purposes, the mass media has become the marketplace of
ideas. "
The Public's Right to a "Robust Debate"
While on its face the "marketplace" theory can be viewed
as an adjunct of the laissez-faire relationship between govern-
ment and the print media, it is also partially responsible for the
modern-day concept of freedom of speech. Judge Learned
Hand, speaking for the court in United States v. Associated
Press,"2 ruled that a judgment enjoining the Associated Press
(a cooperative news-gathering corporation) from forbidding its
members to pass information along to non-members did not
interfere with freedom of the press." The decision was not
reached by simply balancing one set of newspaper interests
against the other. The real interests at stake lay beyond those
of the newspaper industry. The court's primary concern was
that the public receive news from as many different sources,
with as many different "facets and colors," as possible. 4 In
affirming Judge Hand's decision, the United States Supreme
Court declared: "Freedom of the press from governmental in-
terference under the First Amendment does not sanction re-
pression of that freedom by private interests."65
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan6 likewise asserted the
public's right to read diversified news and commentary. There
60. Barron, supra note 53, at 1641.
61. Johnson, supra note 3, at 604.
62. 52 F. Supp. 362 (1943), afJ'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
63. 52 F. Supp. at 374-75.
64. Id. at 372. Judge Hand stated:
[N]either exclusively, nor even primarily, are the interests of the news-
paper industry conclusive; for that industry serves one of the most vital
of all general interests: . .. the dissemination of news from as many
different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is possi-
ble. That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the
interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.
Id.
65. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), aff g 52 F. Supp.
362 (1943).
66. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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the Supreme Court declared that "debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open." 6 To that end,
New York Times denied public officials defamed by newspa-
pers the right to recover damages unless they could show that
the publication was not only false but made with "actual mal-
ice. ""
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC"9 reiterated the notion
that the purpose of the first amendment is to promote competi-
tion of ideas, "to preserve the uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to counte-
nance monopolization of that market." 0 The Court held that
the public has a right to receive information: "It is the right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas which is crucial here. That right
may not constitutionally be abridged.""
In Wollam v. City of Palm Springs," the California Su-
preme Court struck down a city ordinance banning the use of
stationary sound trucks. Wollam held that the right to speak
freely was meaningless if people were prevented from listen-
ing. 3 People, the court declared, not only have the right to
communicate, but the right to communicate effectively. 4
Thus, the first amendment embodies a protectable right to
communicate."' It entails the right to present one's views in an
effective manner and to have access to diversified sources of
information and opinion.
67. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964), citing with
approval, Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). But see Barron's cri-
tique of the New York Times decision, Barron, supra note 53, at 1656-60, wherein he
notes: "Although the libel laws have been emasculated for the benefit of defendant
newspapers where the plaintiff is a 'public official,' the Court shows no corresponding
concern as to whether debate will in fact be assured." Id. at 1657.
68. 376 U.S. at 265-92.
69. 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see notes 86-94 and accompanying text infra.
70. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969), citing New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
71. 395 U.S. at 390 (emphasis added).
72. 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d 481, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963).
73. Id. at 284, 379 P.2d at 486, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
74. Id.
75. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308, 325 (1968).
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Red Lion: The "Paramount" Public Interest
In contrast to the newspaper industry, the broadcast
media have been heavily regulated by the federal government.
The Radio Act of 192711 described broadcast frequencies as a
''scarce resource" which could be regulated effectively only by
the federal government." The Act established the Federal
Radio Commission (which became the Federal Communica-
tions Commission) and empowered it to allocate frequencies
among competing applicants in a manner responsive to the
public interest." Since 1949, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has imposed its "fairness doctrine" upon
broadcasters.79 The fairness doctrine requires that a broad-
caster give adequate, fair and balanced coverage to public is-
sues. ' " Television and radio stations have an affirmative obliga-
tion to seek and, if necessary, to sponsor opposing viewpoints
on matters of public concern.'
As the fairness doctrine shows, the scarcity of available
airwave frequencies has given rise to the view that broadcasters
are public trustees who have been given the privilege of using
the airwaves via licenses granted to them by the FCC; the
licenses do not confer ownership of the frequencies, but merely
the temporary privilege of using them. 2 The Supreme Court
has held that broadcast licensees are "proxies for the entire
community, obligated to give suitable time and attention to
matters of great public concern." 3 In addition to making radio
communication possible, 4 government regulation of the broad-
cast industry thus provides a protective environment in which
first amendment freedoms of expression and communication
can exist.8
76. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162. This statute was later re-enacted
as part of the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1958).
77. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969).
78. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, § 4, 44 Stat. 1163.
79. FCC, REPORT ON EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST LICENSEES, 13 F.C.C. 1246
(1949).
80. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
81. Id. at 377-78.
82. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1958); see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
394 (1969).
83. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969).
84. Id. at 389.
85. In Red Lion, the Court expressed the belief that FCC regulations applying
and interpreting the fairness doctrine "are both authorized by Congress and enhance
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Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC86 involved two chal-
lenges to FCC rulings which required radio stations to provide
free reply time for political candidates and victims of "personal
attack." 7 The United States Supreme Court weighed the inter-
ests of broadcasters in maintaining editorial discretion over the
contents of their radio programs against those of the public in
freedom of speech and the "collective right" to have the media
function in accord with the objectives of the first amendment.88
The Court concluded that the rights of the viewers and listen-
ers, and not those of the broadcasters, were "paramount.""9
Red Lion also held that the FCC "right of reply" regula-
tions were consistent with "the First Amendment goal of pro-
ducing an informed public capable of conducting its own af-
fairs." ' Without appropriate government interference, the
Court reasoned, station owners would be free "to communicate
only their own views on public issues, people, and candidates,
and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed."91
The Court continued:
There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlim-
ited private censorship operating in a medium not open to
all .. ..
... .To condition the granting or renewal of licenses
on a willingness to present representative community
views on controversial issues is consistent with the ends
and purposes of [the First Amendment].2
The Red Lion decision paved the way for an expansive
interpretation of the first amendment in the broadcasting
field-an interpretation which saddled broadcasters with an
rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 375. See, e.g., Anawalt, Radio, Television and the Community, 11 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 229, 233 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Anawalt]; Barrow, The Fairness
Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print Media, 26 HAST. L.J. 659, 665-
67 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Barrow].
86. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
87. For a definition of "personal attack" under FCC regulations, see 47 C.F.R. §
73.123 (1970).
88. 395 U.S. at 390.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 392. Compare this holding with the Court's position in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), regarding newspaper attacks and
"right of reply" legislation; see notes 161-72 and accompanying text infra; notes 4-16
and accompanying text supra.
91. 395 U.S. at 390.
92. Id. at 392-94.
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affirmative duty to provide a forum for the discussion of issues
and ideas. The FCC followed Red Lion by requiring licensees
to present "representative community views and voices on con-
troversial issues" and to do so in a provocative manner. 3 Allow-
ing a licensee to exclude various "partisan voices" and present
discordant viewpoints in its own bland and "inoffensive" way,
the Commission determined, would undermine the "profound
national commitment that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."94
Red Lion Tamed
Four years after Red Lion, the Supreme Court limited the
scope of the broadcaster's duty to provide a public forum. In
response to complaints filed by the Democratic National Com-
mittee and the Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace,
the FCC ruled that certain broadcasters, including CBS, could
refuse to accept paid editorial advertisements. 5 The District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the FCC and held
that when a station or network accepted various other kinds of
paid announcements, a "flat ban on paid public issue an-
nouncements" violated the first amendment."96 The court de-
clared that the public's first amendment interests mandated
that broadcasters present a "full spectrum" of opinion in an
"uninhibited, wide-open fashion."97 The court also stressed the
importance of providing spokespersons with "some opportunity
to take the initiative and editorial control into their own hands
"98
93. In re Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 222 (1970).
94. Id. at 222-23.
95. In re Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970);
In re Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970).
96. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 646
(D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
97. 450 F.2d at 645.
98. Id. at 656. The court further stated:
It has traditionally been thought that the best judge of the importance
of a partisan viewpoint or issue is the individual or group holding the
viewpoint and wishing to communicate it to others. In the First Amend-
ment area, our best guarantee has always been a "free market" in which
partisans who feel strongly on particular issues may decide on their own
to speak out and to speak out in their own way. The present system,
allowing a flat ban on editorial advertising conforms instead to a parter-
nalistic structure in which licensees and bureaucrats decide what issues
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In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee,"9 the Supreme Court reversed the D.C.
Circuit and held that the first amendment did not require
broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertisements.100 A plu-
rality of the Court concluded that a licensee could meet the
requirements of the fairness doctrine merely by providing "a
balanced treatment of controversial questions" in a form "more
comprehensive" than editorial advertising.10° Furthermore, this
policy determination was fundamentally a matter of journalis-
tic judgment to be exercised in the licensee's capacity as a
"private entrepreneur."'0
Strictly in terms of first amendment philosophy, CBS rep-
resented an abrupt retreat from Red Lion. The majority of the
Court in CBS felt that the first amendment interests of the
"public at large," the mass audience, could best be promoted
by weighing the interests of the "access-seeking" public against
those of the broadcast journalists.' 3 CBS implied the existence
of two different "publics" in relation to the first amendment:(1) the public that receives information from the forum (the
"public at large," or the mass audience) and (2) the public that
seeks access to the forum. CBS held that public (1) required
greater protection than public (2). Red Lion, on the other hand,
stood for the proposition that the two publics are indistin-
guishable.
The CBS majority's analysis began with the premise that
the public's right to receive divergent viewpoints was para-
mount; a determination as to whether that paramount right
was being fulfilled or abridged by a station's ban on "public
issue announcements" could best be made by examining the
various first amendment interests affected by the broadcast
industry.104 Simply stated, these interests include free expres-
are "important," how "fully" to cover them, and the format, time and
style of the coverage.
Id.
99. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The majority opinion in this case was authored by Chief
Justice Burger and consisted of four parts. In parts I, II, and IV, Burger was joined by
Justices White, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist. However, with respect to part III,
only Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined the Chief Justice.
100. Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
122-32 (1973).
101. Id. at 118; see note 99 supra.
102. Id. at 118-19; see note 99 supra.
103. Id. at 102, 122, 124.
104. Id. at 102.
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sion by the public on the one hand, and free expression by the
broadcaster on the other. 0 The Court concluded that the
broadcast licensee was-in the best position to balance compet-
ing first amendment considerations' and the decision regard-
ing the acceptance of political advertisements should therefore
be left to the journalistic discretion of the broadcaster.
The majority in CBS apparently found nothing objection-
able in delegating constitutional "balancing" to an entity
which had a direct interest in the outcome. The decision also
managed to dilute the public interest component of the first
amendment. Even though the public at large had a paramount
interest in something called "free expression,' ' 17 that interest
in fact became secondary at the moment the public demanded
an outlet for expression. Those segments of the general public
opting for access to the airwaves suddenly yielded their supe-
rior first amendment status to the discretion of the television
or radio programmer. But curtailing access also curtails the
quantity of "robust debate" which eventually will reach the
public. So, in a sense, CBS elevated the broadcaster's interests
in free expression above those of both publics: the access-
seekers and the mass audience.' 8
Il. THE ACCEss DOCTRINE: AN OVERVIEW
The first amendment protects freedom of expression and
thus the right to communicate. Communication, in turn, is a
process which encompasses both the dissemination and the
receipt of ideas, opinions, or information. 19 Unless one is af-
forded a meaningful opportunity to communicate, the right
itself becomes inconsequential. The California Supreme Court
has said that "The right of free speech necessarily embodies the
105. Id. at 102, 121-22.
106. Id. at 118; see note 99 supra. The Court also assigned great importance to
congressional decisions and the regulatory experience of the FCC. Id. at 103-14, 122,
131-32.
107. Id. at 102, citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969).
108. Extensive commentary has been written on Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. See, e.g., Barrow, supra note 85; The Supreme
Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57, 175 (1973); Comment, Right of Access to
Broadcasting: The Supreme Court Takes a Dim View, 62 GEO. L.J. 355 (1973); Com-
ment, Limited Access to Purchase Public Issue Advertising Time, 27 RUTGERS L. REV.
738 (1974); Comment, The Regulation of Competing First Amendment Rights: A
New Fairness Doctrine Balance After CBS? 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1238 (1974).
109. See notes 62-75 and accompanying text supra.
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means used for its dissemination because the right is worthless
in absence of a meaningful method of its expression."'"'
Vigorous debate and effective communication in matters
of community concern necessitate the availability of an appro-
priate vehicle for the presentation of divergent views. In order
to communicate effectively with one's co-citizens on broad-
scale issues, the individual citizen must have access to a broad-
scale forum. At the core of the theory of a viable "marketplace
of ideas" is "the assumption that protecting the right of expres-
sion is equivalent to providing for it."' The stark reality, how-
ever, is that the newspaper and broadcast industries-with a
dwindling number of physically competing units plus maxi-
mum centralization and monopolization' 2
-are ill-suited to
the presentation of the full range of competing ideas. It has
been said that today's mass media are characterized by a "dull
emphasis on majoritarian values" and a built-in aversion "for
the novel and heretical.""' 3 One observer has found the mass
communications industry culpable of using the first amend-
ment as an excuse to avoid opinions almost entirely."' In any
event, the most appropriate vehicle for discussion of public
issues is frequently the local newspaper-notwithstanding the
availability of other forms of communication." 5
The functional contours of the "right of access" theory are
still quite hazy. Right of access for whom and for what? Which
110. Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 284, 379 P.2d 481, 486, 29
Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1963).
111. Barron, supra note 53, at 1647-48.
112. See notes 20-46 and accompanying text supra.
113. D. LACY, FREEDOM AND COMMUNICATIONS 69 (1961); Barron, supra note 53,
at 1641-50.
114. Barron, supra note 53, at 1646-47.
115. When a person is unable to secure space in a newspaper which serves his or
her community, the availability of other forums within the community does not miti-
gate the adverse impact upon free expression. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974), a case involving "public forum" issues, see notes 173-92 and
accompanying text infra, Justice Brennan observed:
The existence of other public forums for the dissemination of politi-
cal messages is, of course, irrelevant. As the court said in Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939), "one is not to have the exercise of his
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it
may be exercised in some other place."
418 U.S. 298, 316 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Barron, supra note 53, at 1653, underscores the problem as follows: "If a group
seeking to present a particular side of a public issue is unable to get space in the only
newspaper in town, is this inability compensated by the availability of the public park
or sound truck?" Id.
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individuals, ideas, community groups, "minority opinions,"
"unorthodox viewpoints," would be encompassed by such a
right? How does one define "political speech," a "minority
opinion," an "unorthodox viewpoint," a "community group,"
a "minority spokesperson," an "issue," or even an "idea"?
Should the right of access be absolute or qualified? Should it
be limited to the discussion of political issues, or should it be
extended to other areas as well? What is a "political issue"? Is
commercial speech automatically excludable? When is suffi-
cient access attained? How much space should newspapers
provide for forum-seekers? Should they allot a column, a para-
graph, a page, or an insert? Who should make these decisions?
Who should enforce this right of access?1 6
An attempt to define the precise scope of the access doc-
trine is beyond the scope of this article-although some work-
able guidelines will be suggested below. From a pro-access
perspective, the most important inquiry is whether an enforce-
able right of access can withstand constitutional scrutiny in the
aftermath of the Tornillo decision. One thing is certain: the
right must be defined in terms that are "limited . . .practi-
cable and desirable. '"1
7
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: Is TORNILLO THE LAST WORD?
The Red Lion case,"' as well as the decisions of the District
of Columbia Circuit in Business Executives' Move for Vietnam
Peace v. FCC"9 and of the Florida Supreme Court in Tornillo,20
have thus far comprised the judicial high-water marks for the
concept of an affirmative right of access to the mass media.
There are few signs that the courts, after Tornillo, are willing
to apply the Red Lion and Business Executives' positions to the
print media.
116. Lange, supra note 47, at 72-91, suggests several dismal practical ramifica-
tions of the access doctrine. But see Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of
Access to the Media? 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487, 495-98 (1968).
117. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Natal Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 131 (1973).
118. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see notes 86-94 and
accompanying text supra.
119. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom., Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); see notes 95-98 and accom-
panying text supra.
120. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973), rev'd,
418 U.S. 241 (1974); see notes 4-15 and accompanying text supra.
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Newspapers and the "Scarcity" Factor
Red Lion, which gave (over the countervailing rights of
broadcasters) superior status to the public's right to receive
"suitable access to . . . ideas and expressions,"'' cited the
scarcity of available airwaves as the critical factor in its hold-
ing. "'22 The Court, however, considered the scarcity rationale
germane to the broadcast industry alone.2 3
The scarcity argument does in fact apply with equal force
to the newspaper industry. The San Francisco Bay Area, for
example, includes the counties of Marin, Contra Costa, Ala-
meda, Santa Clara, San Mateo and San Francisco. Collec-
tively, these counties are served by 78 commercial radio sta-
tions' and by 64 cable"2 5 and non-cable' television stations.
Yet, the same area is served by only 32 daily newspapers. I2
The Supreme Court opinion in CBS rejected the access
doctrine with regard to paid political broadcasts. 2 1 A footnote
121. 395 U.S. at 390.
122. Id. at 388-92.
123. Id. at 388.
124. The 78 commercial radio stations currently operating in the six above-
mentioned counties are broken down by community as follows: Alameda (1); Berkeley(5); Concord (2); Cupertino (1); Fremont (2); Gilroy (2); Livermore (1); Los Altos (2);
Los Gatos (1); Moraga (1); Mountain View (1); Oakland (5); Palo Alto (3); Pittsburg(1); San Francisco (31); San Jose (10); San Mateo (3); San Rafael (2); Santa Clara(2); Stanford (1); Walnut Creek (1). BROADCASTING PUBLICATIONS, INC., BROADCASTING
YEARBOOK 1975 C14-C27 (1975).
125. The 50 cable television stations currently operating in the six above-
mentioned counties are broken down by community as follows: Albany (1); Antioch(1); Belmont (1); Berkeley (1); Brentwood (1); Brisbane (1); Castro Valley (1); Concord(1); Crockett (1); Daly City (1); Dublin (1); Fremont (1); Gilroy (1); Half Moon Bay(1); Hayward (1); Lafayette (1); Livermore (1); Los Gatos (1); Martinez (1); Menlo
Park (1); Millbrae (1); Novato (1); Oakland (1); Pacifica (1); Pinole (1); Pittsburg (1);
Pleasanton (1); Redwood City (1); San Bruno (1); San Carlos (2); San Francisco (1);
San Jose (1); San Leandro (1); San Mateo (1); San Pablo (1); San Rafael (1); Santa
Clara (1); Saratoga (1); Sausalito (2); South San Francisco (1); Sunnyvale (1); Sunol(1); Tiburon (1); Union City (1); Walnut Creek (1). BROADCASTING PUBLICATIONS, INC.,
BROADCASTING CABLE SOURCEBOOK 1974 45-72 (1974).
126. Fourteen non-cable television stations currently operate in the six above-
mentioned bay area counties. These stations are broken down by community as fol-'
lows: Oakland (1); San Francisco (9); San Jose (3); San Mateo (1). BROADCASTING
PUBLICATIONS, INC., BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 1975 B90-B92 (1975).
127. The 32 daily newspapers currently published in the six above-mentioned
counties are broken down by community as follows: Alameda (1); Antioch (1); Berke-
ley (2, including one student daily); Dublin (1); Fremont (1); Hayward (1); Livermore(1); Martinez (1); Oakland (2); Palo Alto (1); Pittsburg (1); Pleasanton (1); Redwood
City (1); Richmond (1); San Francisco (8, including foreignlanguage dailies); San Jose(4, including one student daily); Stanford (1, student daily); Walnut Creek (1). AVER
PRESS, '76 AVER DIRECTORY OF PUBLICATIONS 135-92 (1976).
128. 412 U.S. 94, 121-32.
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in Justice Brennan's CBS dissent seemed to forecast the
Tornillo outcome,' 9 reaffirming the power of a privately owned
newspaper to advance its own political, social, and economic
views free from any external constraints to provide access.,"
CBS also suggested, however, that the Court would defer to
congressional policy on the question of access rights; and since
Congress, in the interest of preserving "flexibility to experi-
ment with new ideas," had chosen to have issues of this type
resolved by the FCC, the Court determined that the D.C. Cir-
cuit should have accorded similar weight to the judgment of
the FCC.'32 CBS thus implied that a congressional determina-
tion of the need for access to radio and television could with-
stand constitutional attack. By a large stretch of the imagina-
tion, to be sure, the Court's amenability to future FCC policy
guidelines on the question of access might be construed as pre-
scribing an arduous three-step process for those interested in
implementing similar guidelines for newspapers. This would
129. Id. at 181-82 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see notes 154-72 and accompa-
nying text infra.
130. Id. at 182 n.12. In the context of discussing the comparative degrees of
governmental involvement in broadcasting and the publication of newspapers, Justice
Brennan stated:
The decision as to who shall operate newspapers is made in the free
market, not by Government fiat. The newspaper industry is not exten-
sively regulated, and, indeed, in light of the differences between the
electronic and printed media, such regulations would violate the First
Amendment with regard to newspapers.
Id. The plurality opinion in CBS, see note 99 supra stated:
The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political,
social, and economic views is bound by only two factors: first, the accept-
ance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence advertisers-to assure
financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its editors and
publishers.
Id. at 117.
131. Id. at 122.
132. Id. at 122-23. Specifically, CBS sided with four FCC objections to the access
concept as set forth in the Democratic National Committee's demand for editorial
advertising: (1) the views of the affluent would predominate since they could purchase
the most air time; (2) the erosion of journalistic discretion of broadcasters and a shift
in the control over treatment of public issues from the licensees to private individuals
who would not be accountable for broadcast performance; (3) the risk of enlarged
government control over broadcast content posed by FCC implementation of a consti-
tutional right of access; and (4) the current existence of an affirmative and indepen-
dent statutory obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues (the fairness
doctrine). Id. at 123-32. The Court concluded with the observation that "[c]onceiv-
ably at some future date Congress or the Commission-or the broadcasters-may
desire some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable."
Id. at 131.
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entail (1) the securing of congressional legislation regulating
the newspaper industry; (2) the establishment of an adminis-
trative agency with functions similar to those of the FCC; and(3) a determination by that agency that a limited right of ac-
cess is practicable and desirable.'
From Pittsburgh Press to Tornillo: The "Compulsion"
Rationale
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Commission,' the United States Supreme Court resolved animportant first amendment question in favor of the National
Organization for Women (NOW) and against a newspaper pub-lisher. The Pittsburgh Press case dealt with a Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, city ordinance' which prohibited newspapers
from displaying "help wanted" advertisements in sex-
designated colums unless the sex qualification was based upon
a bona fide occupational exemption certified by the city's Com-
mission on Human Relations.' Pursuant to a complaint filed
by NOW, the Commission found that the Pittsburgh Press had
aided unlawful employment practices'37 by maintaining a sex-
designated classification system in its help-wanted section.
The Commission issued a cease-and-desist order which was
challenged by the Press on the grounds that it restricted the
editorial judgment of the newspaper and thus violated its first
amendment right of freedom of the press. 3 '
The Supreme Court held that the ordinance did not under-
mine the "institutional viability" of the press. 3 ' The Court
stated that, in an era dominated by large publishing empires,
"the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity" from
economic regulatory legislation.""0 The majority opinion held
133. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 257-65 infra.
134. 413 U.S. 376 (1973), affg 4 Pa. Commw. 448, 287 A.2d 161 (1972).135. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 75, § 8, Feb. 27, 1967, as amended, Ordinance
395, June 8, 1969.
136. Id. § 8(e).
137. Id. § 8(j) makes it unlawful "for any person, whether or not an employer,
employment agency, or labor organization, to aid in the doing of any act declared tobe an unlawful employment practice by this ordinance."
138. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 379-81
(1973).
139. Id. at 382-83.
140. Id. The Court cited a number of cases requiring the press to comply with
various economic regulations: Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131(1969) (Sherman Act); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wolling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946)
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that the ordinance was not designed to muzzle or curb the
press, significantly impair its ability to publish and distribute
its product, or threaten its financial status.'
The respondents (NOW and the Commission) character-
ized the type of speech involved as "commercial speech" and
therefore unprotected by the first amendment.' The Court
pointed out that not all newspaper advertisements qualify as
"commercial," and thus unprotected, speech;' this was espe-
cially true of "political advertisements" of the type presented
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' The Pittsburgh Press
Court stated that "in crucial respects" the want-ads under
consideration resembled commercial, non-controversial
speech:' "None expresses a position on whether, as a matter
of social policy, certain positions ought to be filled by members
of one or the other sex, nor does any of them criticize the
Ordinance or the Commission's practices.""' 6
The newspaper had contended that what was really at
stake was neither the content nor the character of the adver-
tisements, but rather the right of the publisher freely to exer-
cise editorial judgment."7 The Court conceded that, in a lim-
ited way, the ordinance affected the composition of the news-
paper's help-wanted section,"' and further acknowledged that
placing an employment want-ad in a particular column did
(Fair Labor Standards Act); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178
(1946) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945) (Sherman Act); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (National Labor
Relations Act). 413 U.S. at 382-83.
141. 413 U.S. at 383.
142. Id. at 384. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), held that "the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising." But see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 4686 (U.S. May 24, 1976), where the Court on first amend-
ment grounds, overturned a Virginia statute which banned the advertisement of pre-
scription drug prices. Noting that the advertiser's interest in advertising is purely
economic, the Court commented that "[tihat hardly disqualifies him for protection
under the First Amendment." Id. at 4690. The Court went on to note that "society may
have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information" (Id. at 4690) and
concluded "that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected .... " Id. at
4692.
143. 413 U.S. at 384-85, citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
144. 376 U.S. at 256-58, 292 (Appendix); see notes 66-68 and accompanying text
supra.
145. 413 U.S. at 385.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 386.
148. Id. at 383.
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involve an editorial judgment. 4 Nevertheless, the majority
concluded that the necessity for such decisions was not enough
to remove the ads from the category of commercial speech. 5 0In holding that the order of the Commission did not violate the
first amendment rights of the newspaper,' 5' the Court empha-
sized that its decision was to be construed narrowly.' 2
Even in a narrow sense, Pittsburgh Press can be read as
standing for the proposition that government compulsion maybe brought to bear upon editorial decisions regarding layout
and column placement where (1) noncontroversial, "commer-
cial" speech alone is involved; and (2) some legitimate, coun-
tervailing public policy exists such as ending job discrimina-
tion against women. The decision suggests that the more politi-
cally innocuous an item of speech (or print) is, the less suscep-
tible it is to the exclusive editorial control of the publisher.
Pittsburgh Press, in effect, permits government to intrude into
the newspaper's "layout" process, but only if purely commer-
cial speech is involved.
By so signalling its disinclination to intervene in the edi-
torial process with regard to anything but commercial, politi-
cally neutral newspaper items, the Court has reasoned itselfinto a corner. Why should the Court exempt commercial
speech from private editorial abridgment but not "political"
speech, which, after all, is at the heart of the first amendment?
To begin with, it was somewhat misleading for the Court topredicate its Pittsburgh Press holding upon a tacit characteri-
zation of the particular brand of speech in issue as "nonpoliti-
cal." The disputed column headings ("Jobs-Male Interest"
and "Jobs-Female Interest")'"5 had implications reaching farbeyond the economic marketplace. Indeed, their elimination
was a matter of great sociological and political import. The
Court's perception of the controversial want-ad format as little
more than politically barren print was tantamount to ignoring
the very basis of the feminist movement's interest in the case.Would NOW have filed a complaint over a series of advertise-
ments which totally lacked inherent socio-political signifi-
149. Id. at 386.
150. Id. at 387.
151. Id. at 391.
152. Id. The Court reaffirmed "unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial
judgment." Id.
153. See id. at 392 (Appendix).
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cance? Clearly, the government had entered the forbidden
domain of editorial discretion in order to further its laudable
objectives of terminating racially and sexually discriminatory
employment practices. As an underlying rationale for this in-
trusion, the commercial-noncommercial distinction remains
unconvincing.
The constitutionality of a statutory right of access to the
print media was squarely at issue before the United States
Supreme Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.54
In that case, the newspaper argued that the right-of-reply stat-
ute"'55 upheld by the Florida Supreme Court 5 ' was void on its
face because it purported to regulate the content of a newspa-
per in violation of the first amendment.'57 Speaking for an
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger reviewed the political
candidate's argument in support of an enforceable right of ac-
cess to the press. The Court conceded that there might be some
validity to the various premises underlying the access argu-
ment, but balked at implementing a right of access that would
require a resort to governmental coercion.'58 The Court ex-
pressed strong hostility to governmental restrictions which
exert compulsion upon newspapers to publish "that which 'rea-
son' tells them should not be published."'59 Any such compul-
sion, the Court stated, contravenes the first amendment.6 0
In Tornillo the Court held the right-of-reply statute to be
unconstitutional because it operated as a "command" to news-
papers in the same way as a law forbidding newspapers to print
certain material.'' The Florida statute, the Court observed,
"exacts a penalty on the basis of the conduct of a newspa-
154. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See notes 4-15 and accompanying text supra.
155. See note 6 supra.
156. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (1973); see notes 8-
15 and accompanying text supra.
157. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256, 258 (1974).
158. Id. at 254.
159. Id. at 254-56, citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376, 391 (1973).
160. Id. at 256.
161. Id. The fact that the Florida right-of-reply statute was relatively obscure,
seldom used, and tested only once at the state court level may have been of some
significance: it was an extremely vulnerable target. See, e.g., Lange, supra note 47, at
61 n.273, 67 n.305.
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per." '' 2 This "penalty" consisted of the additional printing and
composing costs involved in publishing a reply, and the usur-pation of space that could have been devoted to other mate-
rial. "'63 The Court feared that newspapers, faced with the pros-
pect of incurring these additional costs, would tend to avoid
controversy and thereby reduce political and electoral cover-
age.' 64 The Tornillo opinion held that the reply statute also
violated the first amendment because it impermissibly in-
truded upon the editorial function. The Court declared:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduitfor news, comment, and advertising. The choice of mate-
rial to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as tolimitations in the size of the paper, and content, and treat-
ment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or
unfair-constitutes the exercise of editorial control andjudgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how government
regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consis-
tent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as
they have evolved to this time."5
The Tornillo outcome represented a dramatic setback forproponents of an enforceable right of access to newspapers. Itdemonstrated the Burger Court's belief that, although a con-
centrated, monopolistic press poses very real dangers in terms
of manipulating news and opinion, the risks of government
participation in the implementation of a viable remedy are far
more hazardous.
The Florida reply statute's unconstitutionality, according
to the Tornillo holding, lay chiefly in the "compulsion" it ex-
erted upon the publisher;166 yet the Court never adequately
explained what it meant by "compulsion." Broadly proscribed
are statutes compelling publishers to print what " 'reason' tells
them should not be published." Does this mean that "unrea-
sonable" exercises of editorial discretion may be subject to gov-
ernment compulsion? By inference, Tornillo raises troublesome
new questions as to what standards are applicable in distin-
guishing "reasonable" from "unreasonable" refusals.
The compulsion factor does not appear to vary signifi-
162. 418 U.S. at 256.
163. Id. at 256-57.
164. Id. at 257.
165. Id. at 258.
166. See notes 158-63 and accompanying text supra.
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cantly between right-of-reply statutes designed to protect pol-
itical candidates and the legal remedies designed to protect
libel victims. Ostensibly, the time at which the compulsion
operates differs in each case: the former constitutes an affirma-
tive requirement to print something, a prior restraint, while the
latter creates a liability which arises after the editor has exer-
cised discretion.'67 Of the Florida reply statute, Justice White
said, "[This law runs afoul of the elementary First Amend-
ment proposition that government may not force a newspaper
to print copy which, in its journalistic discretion, it chooses to
leave on the newsroom floor."'08 But libel laws, too, have the
effect of forcing newspaper editors to leave on the newsroom
floor that which, in their journalistic discretion, they might
choose to print. Arguably, the element of compulsion is equally
pervasive in each case and affects the same class of editorial
decision -making.
The Tornillo opinion acknowledged in a footnote that
newspapers have received special support from Congress by
way of the Newspaper Preservation Act."9 However, the Court
went no further with this observation; apparently, it did not
believe that the Act sanctioned and enforced scarcity of com-
peting entities, or had the effect of freezing the status quo in
the marketplace of journalism. 7 " By failing to see that legisla-
tively imposed scarcity is common to both the newsprint and
broadcast industries, the Court in effect ignored a major prem-
ise underlying the argument for imposing upon large newspa-
pers a fiduciary obligation to the public.' 7' The need for public
accountability in monopolistic newspapers was overshadowed
by what the Court perceived to be the ominous requirement
that the government play an affirmative role in insuring that
accountability.
A major factor in the Tornillo outcome was the "penalty"
which the reply statute exacted in terms of printing and com-
posing costs-the same type of effects which were deemed min-
imal in Pittsburgh Press.'72 The inference to be drawn, then, is
167. See, e.g., 418 U.S. at 261-62 (White, J., concurring), comparing Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
168. 418 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 251 n.16; see notes 38-46 and accompanying text supra.
170. See notes 254-56 and accompanying text infra; see, e.g., notes 46-47 and
accompanying text supra.
171. See notes 76-85, 92-94, 121-27 and accompanying text supra.
172. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 255; see
notes 139-41, 147-51 and accompanying text supra.
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that government may tamper with the help-wanted page but
not with the editorial page. It can be argued, however, that thefinancial burden of making socially motivated adjustments will
be roughly the same regardless of the section of the newspaper
involved. For example, the prohibition of sex-biased employ-
ment ads could reduce advertising revenues from sex-biased
employers and thereby force a corresponding reduction in space
available for news coverage and editorial opinion. Ultimately,
every intrusion by the government-whether it be in the news-
room, the editor's office, the layout room, or the want-ads de-
partment-will have the effect of penalizing the entire newspa-
per. And every encroachment by government, no matter how
narrowly circumscribed, will inevitably affect the "content" of
the publication. In short, claims that the Tornillo case involved
much more government "compulsion" than the Pittsburgh
Press situation are essentially artificial. As a critical factor in
dissuading the Court from imposing upon newspapers the same
public trusteeship which applies to broadcasters, the "govern-
mental coercion" rationale is unconvincing. After all, nothing
"exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper"
like a hefty plaintiff's judgment based upon a liberally con-
strued libel statute.
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights: Implications for the
"Public Forum" Approach
After Tornillo, the prospects for applying the access doc-
trine to large, monopolistic newspapers are not exactly bright.
The intra-first amendment conflict between the publisher's
right to print free from government interference and the pub-
lic's right to a "robust debate" has, for the time being, been
resolved in favor of the publisher. Access advocates can count
on minimal judicial support in further attempts to base an
enforceable right of access on the first amendment. Neverthe-
less, some encouragement may be found in the dissent filed by
four members of the Court in Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights,'7 3 a decision rendered the same day as Tornillo.
The Lehman dissent suggested that right-of-access argu-
ments stand a much better chance of success if a strong link
can be forged between newspapers and the "public forum"
173. 418 U.S. 298, 308 (1974) (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, J.J.,
dissenting).
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concept. In Lehman'74 a political candidate challenged the
constitutionality of municipal regulations which prohibited
political advertising on city transit vehicles. Commuter cars in
the city of Shaker Heights each contained 20 interior advertis-
ing spaces available for lease through Metromedia, the transit
system's exclusive advertising agent.'75 Metromedia had
agreed with the city to accept commercial and public service
advertising but not political advertising. Petitioner, a candi-
date for state office in the upcoming general election, at-
tempted to lease advertising space on the system. Although
space was available and petitioner's proposed advertisement
met the Metromedia copy requirements, he was denied rental
space solely because of the political advertising ban. 7 '
Petitioner argued that the card-space constituted a public
forum protected by the first amendment and that a policy of
excluding political advertisements would deny political candi-
dates equal protection of the law. 7 ' The city maintained that
it had instituted the political advertising ban in its proprietary
capacity in order to minimize chances of abuse, the appearance
of political favoritism, and the imposition of political propa-
ganda upon a "captive" commuter audience. 7 ' The plurality
opinion'79 held that no first amendment forum had been cre-
ated and that the city's legislative objectives in limiting access
to the advertising space were reasonable.'80
The plurality acknowledged that access to public places
for purposes of free speech was an important first amendment
goal, but stressed the need for examining the nature of the
forum involved."' Bus placards, the opinion stated, were not in
the same category as open spaces, meeting halls, parks, street
corners, or public thoroughfares.'82 In this instance the city was
174. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
175. Id. at 309 (dissenting opinion).
176. Id. at 309-10.
177. Id. at 301. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in relevant part: "No State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
178. 418 U.S. at 304.
179. Id. at 298-308. Justice Blackmum delivered the opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. Justice Douglas filed a separate
concurring opinion. Id. at 305-08.
180. Id. at 304.
181. Id. at 303, citing Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
182. 418 U.S. at 303.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
engaged in commerce, not forum sponsorship, and commuter
car advertisements were merely a part of that commercial ven-
ture.' 3 Accordingly, the municipality was free to make reason-
able choices as to the type of advertising appropriate for dis-
play "[in much the same way that a newspaper or periodical,
or even a radio or television station, need not accept every
proffer of advertising from the general public."'' 4
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and
Powell, dissented.' Brennan believed that the city had created
in the transit cars a forum for communication by accepting and
displaying commercial and public service messages.' Once
such a forum had been opened up, the municipality could not
discriminate among forum users solely on the basis of message
content without violating the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.' 7 Political advertising, the dissent emphasized, is
clearly protected by the first amendment, even though it is
subject to reasonable government regulations applied in an
even-handed manner.' 8 Brennan observed that the Court has
deemed certain public places, such as jailhouse grounds, to beinappropriate for use as public forums for communication. 8 '
But by installing advertising facilities aboard its transit vehi-
cles, the city had voluntarily established a forum for self-
expression and thereby waived any argument that the vehicles
were ill-suited as public forums."'0 As a result, the city govern-
ment had the burden of showing clearly that a denial of access
to the forum was made pursuant to neutral, narrowly tailored
"time, place and manner" regulations.' The dissenters did not
feel that the city had discharged its burden; therefore, the ad-
vertising ban should be held unconstitutional."2
The Lehman dissent presents an interesting contrast to
the unanimous Tornillo opinion. Each case involved a political
candidate in search of a medium for political expression. The
Tornillo candidate was denied access to a forum because the
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 308-22.
186. Id. at 310.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 310-11.
189. Id. at 313; see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
190. 418 U.S. at 314.
191. Id. at 317.
192. Id. at 310, 321-22.
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forum itself was a privately owned newspaper. The Lehman
plurality believed that a city transit system should be given the
same quantum of editorial control over advertising allowed to
newspaper publishers. However, because four Justices believed
the medium in question was a government-created "public"
forum, they "crossed over" and decided that the candidate
should have prevailed. Thus the Lehman dissent suggests that
at least a strong minority of the court would be considerably
more sympathetic if right-of-access advocates could demon-
strate that certain newspapers are indeed government-created
forums.
The Critical Issue: Government Involvement
Crucial to the success of any access argument is a showing
that government has played a substantial role in creating,
maintaining or regulating the particular forum in issue. If a
sufficient nexus exists between government activity and a pri-
vate newspaper's denial of access to certain individuals or com-
munity groups, such denials would be subject to judicial scru-
tiny under the first, fourteenth, and possibly the fifth amend-
ments.'93 Where federal or state action is significantly inter-
twined with the deliberate exclusion of some persons from the
newspaper forum, one could argue that government has partici-
pated in an abridgement of free speech and a denial of equal
protection of the laws. Consequently, "invidiously" discrimi-
natory editorial decisions,'94 or those otherwise refusing publi-
cation solely on the basis of message content, would be uncon-
stitutional."'
193. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 721-22,
724-25 (1961); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1951); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
Where the state has allegedly participated in discriminatory conduct, the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment are applicable; see
notes 9 & 177 supra. Where the federal government has purportedly engaged in such
conduct, the due process clause of the fifth amendment applies. Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969);
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964). The fifth amendment provides: "No
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
194. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Karst, Invidious
Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process
Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 716, 739 (1969).
195. See, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 310, 315-18 (1974)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also note 187 and accompanying text supra.
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However, litigants denied access to the print media have
not been successful in attributing such denials to state ac-
tion. "'96 In Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers v. Chicago Tribune Co.,' 7 the Seventh Circuit considered
the state action question and the access doctrine in general.
The Chicago Tribune case involved a labor union's attempt to
secure publication in four major Chicago newspapers of an ad-
vertisement setting forth its reasons for picketing a large retail
department store."8 Defendants in the case were the Chicago
Tribune Company (Tribune), the Chicago American Publish-
ing Company (American), and Field Enterprises, Inc. (Field).
Tribune owned and published the Chicago Tribune.' 9 Ameri-
can, Tribune's wholly owned subsidiary, was the owner and
publisher of Chicago Today,"' and Field owned and published
the Chicago Sun-Times and the Chicago Daily News.'' When
all four newspapers declined to print its advertisement, plain-
tiff sought to have the defendants permanently enjoined from
refusing to publish the ad.2"2 Plaintiff also requested a judg-
ment declaring that defendants (1) could not arbitrarily refuse
to publish advertisements expressing ideas, opinions or facts on
political or social issues; and (2) could not refuse to publish
such advertisements if they were lawful, the party submitting
them was willing to pay the usual rate, and no technical or
196. The first amendment has been extended through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment to prohibit the abridgement of the rights specified therein
by the various states. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Although the fourteenth amendment affords protection from
state action it does not protect against wrongs done by private persons. United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966); Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers
v. Chicago Tribune Co., 307 F. Supp. 422, 425 (N.D. I1. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 470 (7th
Cir. 1970).
197. 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
198. Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co.,
307 F. Supp. 422, 423-24 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970).
199. 307 F. Supp. at 423.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Plaintiff maintained that its complaint alleged facts stating a claim cogniz-
able by a federal district court in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C.§§ 1331 and 1343(3). Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago
Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 1970).
The union's complaint also prayed for an order permanently enjoining defendants
from publishing any advertising submitted by the department store which related to
the issues underlying the picketing. In addition, plaintiff sought damages for breach
of contract and in quasi-contract; the district court granted defendant's motions for
summary judgment on the contractual issues. 307 F. Supp. at 424-25.
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mechanical problems impaired publication.2"
The federal district court granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment and concluded that the absence of state
action deprived the court of jurisdiction. 04 Plaintiff had argued
that defendant newspapers were "quasi-public" entities which
had denied the union an opportunity to state its position on a
public issue, thereby abridging constitutional guarantees of
free speech and equal protection.0 ' Plaintiff contended that the
Red Lion and New York Times decisions mandated for political
advertisers a constitutional right of access to newspapers.0 '
The lower court held that the defendants' acts were distin-
guishable from ostensibly private forms of conduct which other
courts have construed as state action.0 ' On the following
grounds, the district court concluded that state participation
did not pervade the operations of the newspapers, nor could
they be considered "quasi-public" bodies whose conduct rose
to the level of state action:0 ' (1) the press had been afforded
unique constitutional treatment by the first amendment, while
other forms of private commerce and association had not;20 9 (2)
the functional interdependence between defendant newspapers
and the government was minimal2"' in comparison with private
entities such as political parties,2"' company towns, 22 shopping
centers," 3 restaurants situated in state-managed parking ga-
203. 435 F.2d at 472.
204. 307 F. Supp. at 429.
205. Id. at 425.
206. Id. at 428. Although not entirely clear from the body of the district court
opinion, it appears that plaintiff relied upon New York Times for the proposition that
editorial or political advertisements, as opposei to commercial ads, were entitled to
special constitutional protection. See id., citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 265-66, 271 (1964). See also notes 66-71 & 86-94 and accompanying text
supra.
207. 307 F. Supp. at 425-26, comparing Amalgamated Food Employees Union v.
Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946); Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges
& Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969). See, e.g., notes 1-3 and
accompanying text supra.
208. 307 F. Supp. at 427, 429.
209. Id. at 426.
210. Id. at 426-27.
211. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
212. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
213. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
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rages,"1 4 and educational accreditation associations,"5 which
were either functionally indistinguishable from public facilities
or performed inherently "governmental" tasks;2" (3) the press
and the government traditionally have been regarded as disso-
ciated entities in this country, with the press occupying an
independent and often adversarial posture vis-A-vis the govern-
ment.",7
The district court in Chicago Tribune further determined
that the union did not have a constitutional right of access to
the defendant newspapers."' Red Lion, the opinion held, did
not authorize extending the fairness doctrine beyond the
broadcasting field; imposing public obligations upon the elec-
tronic media was necessary because of special technological
considerations which did not apply to newspapers.2"' In moder-
ately encouraging dictum, however, the court said:
If a right of access existed with regard to newspapers, com-
pliance with the [access rule] would be considerably sim-
pler than it is for broadcasters, for a newspaper is a rela-
tively flexible and expandable commodity. The defect in
plaintiff's action is that no such rule exists.220
The opinion also stated that New York Times could not be
interpreted to require. publication by private newspapers of all
paid political announcements. 2 '
214. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
215. See Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges
& Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969).
216. 307 F. Supp. at 426-27. The court stated:
The business of newspapers is not inherently governmental . . . . [Tihe
reporting of the days [sic] events and related commentary is not a gov-
ernmental function. While the government and its officials make news,
they do not publish it. Significantly, while a company town may be
likened to a municipal corporation and a private business district, there
is no state press . ...
Id. at 427.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 428-29.
219. Id. at 428, citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-77,
386-87 (1969), quoting Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Cf. notes 121-27 and accompanying text supra.
220. 307 F. Supp. at 428.
221. Id. The district court articulated some sensitivity to problems stemming
from "stultifying" concentrations of private media power; yet it was more concerned
about the administrative problems which might arise in connection with an open
access policy. Id. at 429, criticizing Barron, supra note 53, at 1666, 1670, 1677. It
expressed the fear that even slight governmental meddling could lead to deprivation
of press freedoms. 307 F. Supp. at 429. Finally, the court suggested that more appropri-
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On appeal,222 the union (appellant) argued that a special
relationship between the newspapers (appellees) and the state
could be predicated on the basis of certain Illinois statutes
which exempted newspaper employees from jury service;223 re-
quired newspaper publication of official notices;2 4 and pro-
vided a use tax exemption for newspapers and other periodi-
cals.225 Appellant also claimed that state action was involved
because a city ordinance restricted sidewalk newsstands to the
sale of daily newspapers published in Chicago,2 and because
government buildings regularly provided work space for news-
paper reporters. 27
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the order of the district
court 28 and held that the authorities relied upon by appellant 9
were inapplicable. 30 The circuit court determined that no pub-
lisher23 ' enjoyed a monopoly position in the Chicago metropoli-
tan area and that no monopoly power had been exercised by
means of combination.232 Available figures, the court noted,
showed a healthy element of competition among the newspa-
pers.233 Further, the appellate court determined that the use
tax exemption did not constitute state action since the state
was not actively participating in the operations of the ex-
empted enterprises.234 The jury service exemption ran to the
individual newspaper employee and represented merely an in-
cidental benefit conferred upon the employer by the state, pre-
cluding any finding that the state was significantly involved in
ate routes to securing a right of access would be via legislation and constitutional
amendment. Id., citing Barron, supra note 53, at 1670, 1676.
222. Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co.,
435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
223. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 4 (1969), cited in 435 F.2d at 473 & n.3.
224. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 7 ,2, § 2; ch. 24, § 1-2-4; ch. 105, § 2-12; ch. 110 § 14
(1969), cited in 435 F.2d at 473 & nn.4-6.
225. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 439.2, 439.32, 440 (1969), cited in 435 F.2d at 478
& n.7.
226. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 34-12 (19 ), cited in 435 F.2d at 473 & n.8.
227. 435 F.2d at 473.
228. Id. at 478.
229. See cases cited in note 207 supra. See also notes 211-15 and accompanying
text supra.
230. 435 F.2d at 474-77.
231. The opinion considered appellees Tribune and American (the wholly owned
subsidiary of Tribune) to be one publisher. Id. at 477 n.10.
232. Id. at 477.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 477-78.
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the defendants' business. 3 ' Statutes requiring certain official
notices to be published in local newspapers might well increase
the publisher's revenues, but they did not give the state a pro-
prietary interest in newspaper profits sufficient to justify a
finding of state action. 3 In addition, the court held that the
newsstand ordinance and the presence of press facilities in pub-
lic buildings inured mainly to the public interest and conveni-
ence, not to the benefit of newspapers. 37 Chicago Tribune flatly
rejected the argument that the first amendment obligates
newspapers to serve as public forums: "The Union's right to
free speech does not give it the right to make use of the defen-
dants' printing presses and distribution systems without defen-
dants' consent. 238
In Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co.,23' a mo-
tion picture producer had filed suit in federal district court to
enjoin the Los Angeles Times from screening, censoring or oth-
erwise altering submitted advertising copy.240 The district court
dismissed the action and the producer appealed. 21' Appellant
argued that the Times, with its large advertising revenues, had
attained a substantial monopoly in southern California.242 In
Los Angeles County and the four surrounding counties, the
Times accounted for 80 percent of all morning circulation pap-
ers as of 1964. Under such circumstances, appellant would
have been foreclosed from effectively advertising its movie
through alternative journalistic channels; had there been com-
petitors in the area of dissemination, the Times' editorial poli-
cies would have been far less consequential .2  Appellant con-
tended that, due to the paper's monopolistic position, it had
assumed a quasi-public status; and this officially sanctioned
status, in turn, constituted state action.24 Hence, respondent's
interference with the right of appellant to advertise was an




239. 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971).
240. Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971).
Plaintiff had invoked federal district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1313(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 440 F.2d at 133.
241. 440 F.2d at 133.
242. Id. at 134.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 53, at 1678.
245. 440 F.2d at 134.
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abridgement by the state of the public's "right to know" and
contravened the first and fourteenth amendments.246 Appellant
also argued that Red Lion compelled a finding that the fairness
doctrine was applicable to newspapers as well as broadcasting
stations .247
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and held that the
Constitution did not require a newspaper to publish advertise-
ments in the exact form submitted simply because the ads were
not legally obscene or unlawful. 48 The court categorized appel-
lant's ad as essentially commercial speech and thus entitled to
less protection than other types of speech. 49 While citing the
"history of disassociation" between press and government and
quoting approvingly from Chicago Tribune,5 0 the court made
no specific determination as to the merits of appellant's state
action claim. Instead, the court said, "Even if state action were
present, as in an official publication of a state-supported uni-
versity, there is still the freedom to exercise subjective editorial
discretion in rejecting a proffered article."2 '' The opinion went
on to state that courts should not be allowed to dictate newspa-
per content.' The court concluded that Red Lion was inappos-
ite because the publication of a newspaper, unlike broadcast-
ing, was not a government-conferred privilege.253
In spite of these defeats on the state action question, there
is room for an argument that Congress has become substan-
tially involved in maintaining certain newspapers as forums for
discussion. Prime targets for a "public forum" attack are those
newspapers exempted from the antitrust laws by the Newspa-
per Preservation Act. 54 Congress has allowed certain newspa-
246. Id.
247. See notes 79-81 & 86-94 and accompanying text supra; see, e.g., notes 121-
27 and accompanying text supra.
248. 440 F.2d at 136.
249. Id., citing Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See also Carpets by
the Carload, Inc. v. Warren, 368 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wis. 1973), holding that commer-
cial advertising is not protected by the freedom of speech and press provisions of the
first amendment and that an advertiser does not have a constitutional right of access
to a newspaper. Id. at 1078.
250. 440 F.2d at 135, quoting Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers
v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973
(1971). See notes 197-238 and accompanying text supra.
251. 440 F.2d at 135, citing Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
252. 440 F.2d at 135.
253. Id. at 136.
254. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1970); see notes 38-46 and accompanying text supra.
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pers25 to pool physical and managerial resources to insure their
survival as diversified organs of news and opinion, and thus is
directly responsible for sustaining these newspapers as forums
for expression. Through special legislation, the federal govern-
ment is, in effect, sponsoring selected newspapers as they
255. H.R. REP. No. 91-1193, supra note 27, identified 22 current "joint newspaper
operating arrangements" intended for coverage by the Newspaper Preservation Act.
Id. at 3547, 3549. These arrangements were listed according to community, year of




San Francisco, Calif ..
M iam i, Fla ............
Honolulu, Hawaii .....
Evansville, Ind .........
Fort Wayne, Ind ........
Shreveport, La ........










El Paso, Tex ...........
Salt Lake City, Utah ..
Charleston, W. Va.
Madison, W is ..........
Year Participants
1950 Birmingham News Co.; Birmingham Post Co.
1940 Citizen Publishing Co.; Arden Publishing Co.; Tucson Newspapers, Inc.
.1964 Chronicle Publishing Co.; Hearst Publishing Co.; San Francisco Newspaper,
Printing Co.
.1966 Miami Daily News, Inc.; Miami Herald Publishing Co.
1962 Hawaii Newspaper Agency, Inc.; Honolulu Star Bulletin, Inc.; Advertiser Pub-
lishing Co., Ltd.
.1938 Evansville Courier, Inc.; Evansville Press Co.; Evansville Printing Corp.
.1950 News Publishing Co.; Journal-Gazette Co.; Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc.
.1953 Times Publishing Co., Ltd.; Journal Publishing Co.; Newspaper Productions Co.
.1957 Globe Democrat Publishing Co.; Pulitzer Publishing Co.
.1933 Journal Publishing Co.; New Mexico State Tribune; Albuquerque Publishing Co.
1950 Journal-Star Printing no.; Star Publishing Co.; State Journal Co.
.1959 Dispatch Printing Co.; E. W. Scripps Co. (Columbus Citizen-Journal).
.1941 Tulsa Tribune Co.; World Publishing Co., Newspaper Printing Corp.
1956 Venango Newspapers, Inc.; News-Herald Printing Co., Derrick Publishing Co.
1961 Pittsburgh Press Co.; Post-Gazette Publishing Co.
1950 Bristol Independent Publishing Corp.; Bristol Newspaper Printing Corp.;
Bristol Herald Courier Publishing Corp.
1957 Knoxville News-Sentinel Co.; Roy N. Lotspeich Publishing Co., Inc.
1937 Nashville Banner Publishing Co.; Tennessean Newspapers, Inc.;
Newspaper Printing Corp.
1936 El Paso Times, Inc.; Herald-Post Publishing Co.; Newspaper Printing Co.
1952 Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Co.; Desert News Publishing Co.; Newspaper
Agency Corp.
1958 Daily Gazette Co.; Charleston Mail Association; Newspaper Agency Corp.
1948 Wisconsin State Journal Co.; Madison Newspapers, Inc.; Capital Times Co.
Id. at 3549.
The House Report also indicated that several of the participants in existing joint
newspaper operating arrangements belonged to newspaper chains:
Chain
Block newspapers ...............
James M. Cox newspapers .......
Hearst newspapers ..............
Knight newspapers ...........




... Pittsburgh, Pa .......
...... M iam i, Fla ............
...... San Francisco, Calif ......
...... M iam i, Fla .............
...... Lincoln, Neb ......
M adison, W is .............
...... Birmingham , Ala ..........
St. Louis, M o .............
...... Birmingham, Ala .... ....
Evansville, Ind ...........




El Paso, Tex ..............
Paper
Post Gazette Publishing Co.
.. Miami Daily News, Inc.
.. Examiner
Miami Herald Publishing Co.
Star Publishing Co.
.. Wisconsin State Journal Co.
Birmingham News Co.
.Globe Democrat Publishing Co.
.Birmingham Post Co.
.Evansville Press Co.




.Herald Post Publishing Co.
Id. at 3550.
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struggle to maintain a foothold in the marketplace of ideas.
Congressional stewardship constitutes sufficient governmental
involvement in the operations of legislatively favored newspa-
pers to qualify them as public forums. Any denial of access to
those forums is tantamount to a denial by government and
should be subject to strict scrutiny under the first and fifth
amendments.256
CONCLUSIONS
A Congressional reassessment of newspaper monopolies,
their effect upon public opinion, and their responsibilities to
the public must be undertaken. A carefully controlled, limited
right of access for responsible public interest groups and citi-
zens should be implemented if Congress, pursuant to its fact-
finding function, determines that the need exists. Congress
may well conclude that the "scarcity of frequencies" considera-
tion which prompted enactment of the Radio Act257 and the
Communications Act25 are paralleled in the modern newspaper
industry. Where the Newspaper Preservation Act has "li-
censed" the merger of publishing resources by exempting cer-
tain newspapers from federal antitrust laws, Congress may de-
cide that at least these "licensees" should conform to some
standard of public trusteeship.
Congress conceivably could create a regulatory agency for
the limited purposes of receiving complaints in those newspa-
per market areas designated as "monopolistic," conducting
quasi-judicial hearings, and issuing orders insuring compli-
ance with appropriate access legislation. Such legislation could
be predicated on the congressional power to regulate interstate
256. See notes 9, 191-95 and accompanying text supra.
The fact that newspapers and editors might still be considered "private" parties
is no bar to a finding of substantial governmental involvement. Courts have found state
action to exist where government did not affirmatively participate in seemingly "pri-
vate" racial discrimination or the abridgement of free speech, but merely "acquiesced"
therein. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 395 U.S. 715 (1961), held that where
the state had simply leased a portion of its facilities to a private entity, it had "ac-
quiesced" in racial discrimination practiced by that entity. Id. at 725. See Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946). Cf. Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 307 F. Supp. 422, 425-27 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 435
F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970).
257. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162. See notes 76-78 and accompany-
ing text supra.
258. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 49 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
609 (1955). See note 76 supra.
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commerce. ' It is likely that this hypothetical regulatory
agency would exert a certain amount of "compulsion" upon
newspaper publishers, but the compulsion should be expressly
limited to the provision of space for responsible public interest
groups and individuals on a revolving basis. According to such
factors as size and circulation, newspapers would be required
to provide reasonable per diem quantities of such space.
Through this system, government would not be exerting any
control over the editorial posture of a monopolistic newspaper
itself. In terms of content, government would simply be insert-
ing blank space. Various community groups and private parties
would supply the copy. Within this format, editors could retain
discretion, subject to complaint-initiated agency review, re-
garding potentially obscene or libelous material.
It is likely that such "benign" compulsion would be stren-
uously opposed by newspaper interests. It is presently uncer-
tain how the United States Supreme Court would react to such
a process. While CBS suggested that the Court would be recep-
tive to innovative legislative policies relating to access in
broadcasting,260 the Court indicated its outright hostility for
government-newspaper entanglements in its Tornillo decision.
Many newspapers do in fact make forum space available
to their readers. After the Tornillo decision, the executive edi-
tor of the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin remarked, "The Su-
preme Court decision makes it more important than ever for
us to seek out and print all sides of every issue."2 ' As a rule,
newspaper editors are anxious to rebut charges of unfairness
and bias. 62 Letters-to-the-editor pages have recently been ex-
panded in several dailies.2"3 "Op-Ed" sections, which may con-
tain articles by local community leaders, letters, and diversi-
fied commentary on current events, have been established in
such papers as the New York Times and the Cleveland Plain
Dealer. Other newspapers have installed "ombudsmen," "pub-
lic editors," and "reader contact editors" to review complaints
259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides in relevant part: "The Congress shall have
power . ..[tlo regulate Commerce . ..among the several states .... .. See, e.g.,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). Newspapers constituting interstate com-
merce fall within the scope of permissible congressional regulation. See Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1957).
260. 412 U.S. 94, 131-32. See notes 131-32 and accompanying text supra.
261. TIME, Sept. 9, 1974, at 48.
262. Id. at 48-49.
263. Id. at 48.
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concerning fairness and accuracy. 64 The formation of local re-
view boards composed of concerned citizens, representatives
from minority groups, civic leaders, educators, and media rep-
resentatives could provide an additional means of promoting
greater access to the press. The boards-modelled, for exam-
ple, after the Better Business Bureau-could monitor local
media coverage and receive complaints concerning public ac-
cessibility of local newspapers and broadcasting stations.265
The Tornillo decision does not necessarily mean that the
access doctrine and a free press are forever doomed to constitu-
tional incompatibility. It does mean that the key to winning
eventual court approval of the access doctrine lies somewhere
in the delicate process of implementation. The United States
Supreme Court has indicated an acceptance of the basic prem-
ise of the access argument-that growing concentrations of
publishing power endanger the marketplace of ideas."' From
the judicial perspective, however, the prospect of government's
indispensable participation in effectuating access is a much
greater danger.267 The Court fears the cure more than it does
the sickness. Yet what the Court really seems to dread is the
spectre of remedial government action rather than any specific
legislative approach to the problem. The fate of the access
doctrine should be tied to congressional findings of fact and
comprehensive, cautiously drafted legislation-not to anti-
quated right-of-reply statutes. 26 No curative formula can ever
hope to win judicial acceptance without careful preparation
and testing by the legislative branch. Until Congress actually
undertakes the implementation of a right of access to newspa-
pers, the access doctrine will remain little more than an in-
triguing constitutional concept.
Since before the turn of the twentieth century it has been
the long-standing policy of our government to foster commerce;
yet, today the effective marketplace of ideas is dwindling while
monopolization of the newspaper industry is increasing. Our
264. Id.
265. Compare this proposal with the current role of the public in FCC licensing
procedures. Anawalt, supra note 85, at 251-58. More comprehensive schemes for imple-
menting a right of access to the printed media have been suggested in other quarters.
See Barron, supra note 53, at 1666-78.
266. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-54 (1974).
267. Id. at 254-58; see notes 158-60 and accompanying text supra.
268. See note 161 supra.
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early goals must be reaffirmed and implemented as swiftly,
promptly and decisively as possible if our society is to be as
contemporary in its exchange of thoughts as it is in the ex-
change of products.
